



# Building Intelligent Networks with Cisco 5G Converged SDN Transport Security and Programmability

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# Agenda

- 1 Market and Evolution
- 2 Trustworthy Platforms & XR Security  
for 5G Converged SDN Transport
- 3 XR Programmability  
for 5G Converged SDN Transport

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# A Changing World Served by Telecommunications

**\$12.3T**

revenue growth  
in industries by 2035\*

**7X mobile  
traffic growth**

980 EB/year in 2024  
79% will be video\*\*

smart cities, connected cars, AR/VR,  
telehealth, smart grid, etc.



**\$3.5T**


mobile industry growth and 22  
million jobs by 2035\*

**More people,  
more things**

5.8 billion mobile users in 2024\*\*  
3X speed increase\*\*  
IoT/M2M traffic grows 8x by 2024\*\*


# Why we need Converged SDN Transport Network?

## Machines are Becoming The Consumer




A different Machine Type Communication Dominates Connectivity

## Bandwidth demand remains in parallel to data density



5G drives up to 100x traffic capacity


## Diversified Services becoming de-facto



Static today  
↓  
Adaptive

A single network "Sliced" in to sub networks to meet economics

## Edge Services will require SLA based Access



63%  
Edge compute services require URLLC by 2023

Networks will evolve deeper to edge for low Latency

# Architecture Evolution


1. Decomposition of network functions (e.g., CUPS) &
  - Distribution to network data plane functions deeper into network
  - Centralization of policy and control functions
2. Automate and Program Network Connectivity
  - Dynamic placement of functions and interconnectivity across network
  - Connectivity isolation and SLA management using network slicing
  - Mass Scale Networks employ scalable fulfillment, assurance and visibility
3. Securing network devices and connectivity
  - Integrity and confidentiality of platforms and network slices

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# Why Security is Mandatory for Service Providers!


Targeted attacks on **Critical Infrastructure**



Impact on Economy



Untrusted Locations



Complex to Manage






# Foundations of Trustworthy Platforms

←----- Process ----- Technology ----- Policy ----->

## Secure Process

### Lifecycle / Security Baseline



## Trustworthy Systems Technology

### Common Modules & Hardware

- Trust Anchor
- Secure Boot
- Entropy
- Immutable Identity
- Image Signing
- Common Crypto
- Secure Storage
- Run Time Integrity
- Trust Visibility

## Secure Standards

### Information Assurance (IA)



Common Criteria



ISO 27034



FIPS / USGv6




TCG

# Trustworthy Platforms – Network OS View

NOS

Protection against


XR Protection



Ransomware



MitM attacks



3<sup>rd</sup> Party Security



Known Vulnerabilities



Credential Theft



Malware Attacks



Malware Attacks



Boot Vulnerability




Counterfeit Hardware

- Run-time defenses
- Integrity Measurement Arch.
- Disk Encryption
- Remote Attestation

- Measured Boot
- Security Enhanced Linux

- Trust Anchor Module
- SUDI
- Secure Boot
- Chipguard

# Components of Trustworthy Platforms



## Hardware Integrity

Provides counterfeit hardware protection and acts as a trust anchor



## Boot Integrity

Ensures integrity of the boot process



## Runtime Integrity

Ensures integrity of the IOS-XR runtime



## Trust Visibility

Provides visualization of Trust

# Cisco TAM – Hardware-based Trust Anchor



Anti-Theft and Anti-Tamper Chip Design

Built-In Crypto Functions


Hardware Entropy for RNG\*

Secure Storage

- Hardware designed to provide both end-user and supply chain protections
  - End-user protections include highly secure storage of user credentials, passwords.
  - Supply chain protections -- Cisco SUDI (**Secure Unique Device Identifier**) inserted during manufacturing
- Secured at Manufacturing. No user intervention required
- Ideal for embedded computing like routers and Wi-Fi access points

\* NIST 800-90 certified

# TAm Chip Module Overview




# Cisco Secure Boot - Overview

## Anchors Secure Boot in Hardware to Create a Chain of Trust



### Cisco Secure Boot

Boot Code Integrity Anchored in Hardware




### Software Authenticity:

- Only authentic signed Cisco software boots up on a Cisco platform
- The boot process stops if any step fails to authenticate
- Each step validates the signature of the next stage before proceeding
- The TAM chip acts as the anchor to the secure boot and the chain of trust starts from hardware

# Chipguard Workflow (BIOS)


- BIOS fetches the factory programmed hash values from imprintDB
- The hash values are compared with the ObserveDB generated in the previous step
- BIOS continues with boot process if and only if the hashes match



# Linux Integrity Measurement Architecture (IMA)



## IMA Logging



```
10 d93ea3e04ba8d68d7bf032f15963467a929a1e30 ima-sig
sha256:db48006f4c5decf1c70abdc849efa4618422420d031c202f6b99f0b185adc0a6 /bin/bash
0302046ebaed830100822239998463f30686f6c0946d4d0ebd95567469866c23a3de0fe210e4c84c3
ea95234a7dbf0565ed2549928b91a45f7bef59787460dc83ccd3ac9c6f39d7e7ef252f863f19afaf7
2fa9b0dbe2a96d2f84aa9ce9007b5bdcbb94d11d7085d9c25be68f6bd1566044f83ec17c770d66ccb
88b5db6a284527d95001d00cff92e14fd544bb2c4c9ffd17364d35c403f895f537c41da37e27b0284
b5f4ce1fde0d0730cef5e93b0971e4325a849e27ac85a6ec546631a3890808667d24411e80d430c7c
c0f93a8c6cf8ce9c5d3baf37423864d238540ea686569f685730a2e96e5fbefbc73be3d3eea716587
598e3df728f7fd3c64b3779d2b19d095c3405242fe40
```

**IMA Log:** /sys/kernel/security/ima/ascii\_runtime\_measurements

- IOS-XR adopted Linux IMA which ensures every file loaded during runtime goes through a measurement / appraisal
- All files in an XR image have an **IMA signature** over a SHA-256 hash of the file contents **computed during build**
- Kernel measures and verifies the signature and extends the PCRs in TAM chip
- IMA violations will be logged in audit.log
- IMA policy is set in initrd (which is signed) and mode is enabled through grub.cfg (which is signed)



# Boot Integrity Visibility (BIV) – Validate Trust



- Measure each boot stage
- Securely store measurements
- Retrieve signed measurements from TAM
- Compare against reference measurements


External service to Verify trust

Device Name	Device ID	IP Address	Trust Status
PC-001	ABC123456	10.100.10.10	Trust
PC-002	ABC123457	10.100.10.20	Trust
PC-003	ABC123458	10.100.10.30	Trust
PC-004	ABC123459	10.100.10.40	Trust
PC-005	ABC123460	10.100.10.50	Trust

Attestation Server

Validate


Reference Measurement Database



# How Trust Validation Works – Trust Insights




1



Trust Insights securely requests and collects signed evidence dossier from IOS XR devices

2



Dossier evidence verified and added to timeline of running hardware and software

3




Trust data verified against Known-Good-Values (KGV) for hardware and software from Cisco

4




Trust Insights delivers assured inventory reporting with history, and trust visibility for IOS XR systems

5



Trust and Assured Inventory data accessible via API to enable Closed-Loop Automation

# Examples of Security Features Built on Foundations of Trust



## Secure ZTP

RFC8572 compliant secure zero touch provisioning of routers



## Disk Encryption

Provides data-at-rest protection for configuration data



## Secure Vault


Protects sensitive data of non-XR applications



## Anti-theft Mechanisms

Provides re-image protection for routers to deter thefts

# Trusted Path Routing - Centralized



# Distributed Trusted Path Routing




**Crosswork Cloud Trust Insights**  
Measure, audit and verify network hardware and software trustworthiness

**Report on Trust**

**1** Crosswork Data Gateway collects Trust Dossier


0110  
110010  
0110



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# Advanced Device Programmability for 5G Era




Model-driven  
(Native & OpenConfig Data Models)

APIs @ all levels of the Software Stack


Extendable to 3<sup>rd</sup> Party Software

# IOS XR Programmability – Key Components





# IOS XR Programmability – A Primer



# IOS XR Models – Styles

Manage



**Native Models**



**OpenConfig Models**

Comes integrated in IOS XR today (~1100 Native and ~100 OC models – XR 7.3.1)

Note: There is no “one standard” – In programmability it does NOT matter – APIs matter

# IOS-XR Configuration Model Examples

Deploy

Deploy

EC

7.0.1	7.1.1	7.2.1	7.3.1	7.4.1/7.5.1
Interfaces Bundles ARP LACP VRF Static routing RIB MPLS (LDP, LSD, L3VPN) Telemetry NETCONF gRPC SNMP	BGP ISIS OSPF (v2/v3) MPLS (TE) RSVP	QoS ACL (IPv4, IPv6, Ethernet, prefix list, object group) Multicast (AMT, IGMP, MLD, MSDP, PIM)	Around 40 new models under testing	Over 200 models under development

- XR or platform specific
- Full coverage of device functionality
- Single abstraction for YANG and CLI

- Full parity and deterministic coverage
- Same help/doc strings
- Expected to be current

# IOS XR Yang Model Documentation



XR 7.0.2 / 7.1.1




- Backwards incompatible changes are documented on GitHub
  - <https://github.com/YangModels/yang/tree/master/vendor/cisco/xr/731/BIC>
  - Definitions based on RFC6020, Section 10
- Format
  - HTML
  - JSON (available)
- Full list of Models available in per XR release
  - <https://github.com/YangModels/yang/blob/master/vendor/cisco/xr/731/Available-Content.md>

Cisco-IOS-XR-invmgr-oper.yang
<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• <a href="#">XPaths Obsoleted</a></li><li>• <a href="#">XPaths Deprecated</a></li><li>• <a href="#">XPaths Added</a></li><li>• <a href="#">XPaths Removed</a></li><li>• <a href="#">XPaths Modified</a></li></ul>
<b>XPaths Obsoleted</b>
N/A
<b>XPaths Deprecated</b>
N/A
<b>XPaths Added</b>
N/A
<b>XPaths Removed</b>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• (L444) /inventory/entities/entity[name]/attributes/vm-done</li><li>• (L454) /inventory/entities/entity[name]/attributes/slot-info</li><li>• (L459) /inventory/entities/entity[name]/attributes/env-sensor-info-xml</li></ul>
<b>XPaths Modified</b>
N/A

# Model-driven Telemetry


Three key changes: Push, not pull. Based on Data Models. Ready for analytics




# Telemetry vis-à-vis SNMP – “No Contest”





### Counters



### CPU load



### Time to collect all data (chassis, 576x100GE)



- ✓ More counter data
- ✓ Reduction in CPU load
- ✓ Faster collection

# gRPC compression




XR 7.1.2 / 7.2.1



- Support for compression has been added to XR gRPC implementation
- No configuration required for gNMI clients
  - Clients use CallOption "UseCompressor"
- New configuration under *protocol grpc per destination (dialout)*

```
telemetry model-driven
destination-group notls
address-family ipv4 192.168.122.1 port 9902
encoding self-describing-gpb
protocol grpc no-tls gzip
!
!
!
```



# Leaf-level filtering



XR 7.2.1






- Current subscriptions are internally mapped to the corresponding container (gather path)
- New feature to allow subscription at individual leaf level
  - Multiple leaves can be specified in a single subscription
  - Optimized to avoid duplicate internal collections



# AI Driven Telemetry (ADT)




XR 7.3.1



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# API Layers in IOS XR -> "Control" with SL-API




# Examples of Using Service Level API (SL-API)

Control

Use Case	Github Code Location
Open/R running on IOS-XR as an IGP	<a href="https://github.com/akshshar/openr-xr">https://github.com/akshshar/openr-xr</a>
Programmable BGP Route Download	<a href="https://github.com/Cisco-Service-Layer/openbmp-controller">https://github.com/Cisco-Service-Layer/openbmp-controller</a>
Egress Traffic Controller Telemetry based route selection	<a href="https://github.com/Maikor/nanog71-hackathon">https://github.com/Maikor/nanog71-hackathon</a>
IPv6 neighbor based path failover (Telemetry+SL-API)	<a href="https://github.com/akshshar/xrtelemetry-slapi">https://github.com/akshshar/xrtelemetry-slapi</a>
Interface Events based path failover (SL-API + YDK)	<a href="https://github.com/akshshar/ydk-slapi-remediation">https://github.com/akshshar/ydk-slapi-remediation</a>

# Cisco SP – Full Stack Software Offerings



# Summary

# Key Take-aways

- Platform security is key to complement 5G transport security
- Trust starts in development stage for HW and SW and is anchored in HW
- Operational Simplification in XR delivered via Data Models
- XR Programmability Infrastructure Hardening
- Wide range of deployment styles envisioned – DIY, Full Stack & Hybrid

# Resources

- **Cisco 5G Transport** – [www.cisco.com/go/5g-transport](http://www.cisco.com/go/5g-transport)
- **White Paper : Trustworthy Converged Mobile xHaul Networks** – <https://www.cisco.com/c/dam/en/us/solutions/collateral/service-provider/mobile-internet/white-paper-sp-trustworthy-converged-mobile-xhaul-networks.pdf>
- **White Paper : 5G Security Innovation with Cisco** – <https://www.cisco.com/c/dam/en/us/solutions/collateral/service-provider/service-provider-security-solutions/5g-security-innovation-with-cisco-wp.pdf>
- **White Paper : Cisco Converged 5G xHaul Transport**– <https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/solutions/service-provider/mobile-internet/5g-transport/converged-5g-xhaul-transport.html>
- **Cisco Trustworthy Technologies** - <https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/about/trust-center/technology-built-in-security.html>

